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NOTE
CASSIRER V. THYSSEN-BORNEMISZA
COLLECTION FOUNDATION:
THE HOLOCAUST EXPROPRIATED
ART RECOVERY ACT WAS UNVEILED BUT
CONGRESS STILL HAS WORK TO DO
NICHOLAS JOY*
INTRODUCTION
Bella Jakubowicz Tovey, a Holocaust survivor who lived in Poland
at the start of World War II (“WWII”), provided the following account:
In the fall of 1939, there was a knock on our door. And there was a
German woman, and two SS men were with her . . . they came into
our apartment, and she walked through the apartment and she turned
to the SS men and she said . . . “I like it. All of it . . . .” [A] day later
. . . they brought in a truck and . . . took everything out of our
[house].1
On September 1, 1939, the German invasion of Poland set off a
chain of events that led to the start of WWII in Europe.2 Almost six years
later, on May 9, 1945, the fighting in Europe came to an end when Ger-
* J.D. Candidate, Golden Gate University School of Law, May 2019; B.A. Anthropology,
Saint Mary’s College of California, May 2013. Managing Editor, 2018-2019, Golden Gate
University Law Review. The author would like to thank Professor Michael Daw and the entire
Golden Gate University Law Review staff for their assistance in the writing and editing of this piece.
Lastly, the author would like to thank everyone else who helped make this Note possible, including
his father, partner, and other loved ones.
1 Interview with Bella Jakubowicz Tovey, Holocaust Survivor (1990), https://www.ushmm
.org/wlc/en/media_oi.php?ModuleId=0&MediaId=1102.
2 U.S. Holocaust Mem’l Museum, World War II in Europe, HOLOCAUST ENCYCLOPEDIA,
https://www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/article.php?ModuleId=10005137 (last visited Sept. 24, 2018).
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many surrendered.3 By the end of WWII over 60 million people had died
and approximately 25 million people had been wounded.4 Few events
had a greater impact on the number of lives lost during WWII than the
rise of the Nazi Party under the leadership of Adolf Hitler.5 Once elected,
Hitler began to dismantle Germany’s political structure in order to de-
velop a government where he had absolute discretion to carry out any act
that he deemed necessary to protect Germany and its citizens.6
Hitler singled out Germany’s Jewish population as the cause of Ger-
many’s economic decline after World War I, and he determined that it
was necessary to annihilate “the Jews” before Germany could be restored
to prominence.7 The Nazis initiated a campaign to separate Germany’s
Jewish population from the rest of society, through propaganda and leg-
islation.8 The Nuremberg Laws, which were enacted in 1935, caused the
plight of Germany’s Jewish population to take a turn for the worse.9 The
Nuremberg Laws labeled all Jewish people as impure and revoked their
citizenship.10 Furthermore, the Nuremberg Laws gave Germany’s courts
the authority to charge someone as an enemy of the state, solely because
of their race, ethnicity, or religious affiliation.11 The Nazis’ propaganda
and legislative efforts were effective, and Germany’s Jewish population
was separated from the rest of society as a result.12
After the Nuremberg Laws were passed, the Nazi Party hierarchy
gathered at the Wannsee Conference and drafted the Final Solution,
which was its plan to eliminate Jewish people and their culture from
history.13 The Final Solution detailed how the Nazis would kill Jewish
citizens and other minority groups on a large scale through the use of
3 Id.
4 Research Starters: Worldwide Deaths in World War II, NAT’L WWII MUSEUM, https://www
.nationalww2museum.org/students-teachers/student-resources/research-starters/research-starters-
worldwide-deaths-world-war (last visited Sept. 24, 2018).
5 Jennifer Elisa Smith, A “Just and Fair Solution”: Creating an Environment for Resolving
Nazi Era Art Restitution Claims Equitably, 31 MD. J. INT’L L. 257, 259 (2016).
6 Joshua M. Greene, The Second George S. Prugh Lecture in Military Legal History: Hitler’s
Courts: Betrayal of the Rule of Law in Nazi Germany, 196 MIL. L. REV. 155, 158 (2008), available
at https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/Military_Law_Review/pdf-files/196-summer-2008.pdf.
7 Lorraine Boissoneault, The First Moments of Hitler’s Final Solution, SMITHSONIAN MAG.
(Dec. 12, 2016), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/first-moments-hitlers-final-solution18096
1387/#Hf4bITCzSZYgI07A.99.180961387/#Hf4bITCzSZYgI07A.99.
8 Greene, supra note 6, at 159.
9 Id.
10 Id.
11 Id.
12 Id.
13 Christian Gerlach, The Wannsee Conference, the Fate of German Jews, and Hitler’s Deci-
sion in Principle to Exterminate All European Jews, 70 J. MOD. HIST., 759, 793-94 (1998).
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concentration camps.14 The Nazis also believed it was imperative that all
remnants of Jewish culture were eliminated in order to fully achieve the
goals laid out in the Final Solution.15 However, the elimination of Jewish
cultural artifacts became a veil for Nazi officials to hide their true inten-
tions behind, and they began to steal valuable possessions from affluent
Jewish families for their own personal gain.16 Nazi officials kept the art
in their private collections or sold the paintings to finance personal and
military expenses.17 In total, the Nazis stole an estimated 650,000 pieces
of art during WWII, which still is “the greatest displacement of art” in
history.18
Today, the effort to seek out those responsible for the atrocities com-
mitted during the Holocaust continues. The pain and suffering caused by
the systematic killing of millions can never be undone, but humanity
must seize any remaining chance to remedy harms caused by the Holo-
caust.19 The restitution of artwork stolen by the Nazis provides humanity
with such an opportunity.
Cassirer v. Thyssen-Bornemisza Collection Foundation exemplifies
the difficulties a claimant faces when they bring a restitution claim in a
U.S. court.20 While it is undisputed that the Nazis used forcible means to
take a painting that belonged to the Cassirers, the family has still had to
fight for decades to prove that they are the rightful owners.21 In 2015, the
United States District Court for the Central District of California (“dis-
trict court”) granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, find-
ing that they had satisfied the requirements for its adverse possession
claim, and awarded them possession of the painting.22 The district court
14 Benno Mu¨ller-Hill, The Idea of the Final Solution and the Role of Experts, in THE FINAL
SOLUTION: ORIGINS AND IMPLEMENTATION 62, 68 (David Cesarani ed., 1st ed. 1996).
15 See generally The Nazi Regime, PROJET ALADIN, http://www.projetaladin.org/holocaust/en/
history-of-the-holocaust-shoah/the-nazi-regime.html (last visited Sept. 9, 2018).
16 Anne Rothfeld, Nazi Looted Art, 34 PROLOGUE MAG., no. 2, Summer 2002, https://www
.archives.gov/publications/prologue/2002/summer/nazi-looted-art-1.html (last reviewed Dec. 12,
2017).
17 Id.
18 Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-308, § 2, 130 Stat.
1524.
19 U.S. Holocaust Mem’l Museum, Documenting Numbers of Victims of the Holocaust and
Nazi Persecution, HOLOCAUST ENCYCLOPEDIA, https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/
documenting-numbers-of-victims-of-the-holocaust-and-nazi-persecution (last visited Sept. 23,
2018).
20 See Cassirer v. Thyssen-Bornemisza Collection Found., 862 F.3d 951, 957 (9th Cir. 2017),
cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 1992 (2018).
21 Id. at 955-56 (discussing that the Nazis forced the Cassirer family to sell the painting in
1939).
22 Cassirer v. Thyssen-Bornemisza Collection Found., 153 F. Supp. 3d 1148, 1167-68 (C.D.
Cal. 2015), rev’d and remanded, 862 F.3d 951 (9th Cir. 2017).
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also held that the plaintiff’s claim was untimely under the applicable stat-
ute of limitation, and was thus barred.23
When Cassirer returned to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit in 2017, the court held that the district court’s decision
to grant the defendant’s motion for summary judgment was improper.24
The Ninth Circuit overturned the decision because a factual dispute ex-
isted as to whether the defendant knew the painting was previously sto-
len,25 and under the recently enacted Holocaust Expropriated Art
Recovery Act (“HEAR”) the plaintiff’s claim was timely.26 If HEAR’s
effectiveness was judged solely on the Ninth Circuit’s decision to reverse
the district court’s ruling, then the Act would be deemed a success.27
Congress intended for HEAR to be a means of ensuring that Ameri-
can courts are able to account for the troubling historical context behind
Holocaust-era art restitution cases.28 Congress’s intent behind HEAR
will not be achievable unless the Act’s provisions are ammended so that
the Act addresses other hurdles that commonly arise in art restitution
cases, which can impact a claimant’s chances at obtaining a just and fair
resolution of his or her claim. If HEAR is not amended, Congress should
establish an alternative form of dispute resolution for Holocaust-era art
restitution cases because America’s courts are not currently fit to ensure
that these cases are resolved fairly or justly.29
This Note examines the Ninth Circuit’s discussion of HEAR’s provi-
sions, which highlight several problems that Congress failed to address
when it enacted the Act and looks at whether the court could have inter-
preted the Act differently. Section I of this Note discusses the case’s
procedural history. Section II discusses the Cassirer family story and
looks at the history of America’s legislative efforts aimed at impacting
23 Id. at 1168.
24 Cassirer, 862 F.3d at 981.
25 Id. at 973.
26 Id. at 960 (quoting Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-
308, § 5, 130 Stat. 1524, 1526) (“Notwithstanding any other provision of Federal or State law or any
defense at law relating to the passage of time, and except as otherwise provided in this section, a
civil claim or cause of action against a defendant to recover any artwork or other property that was
lost during the covered period because of Nazi persecution may be commenced not later than 6 years
after the actual discovery by the claimant or the agent of the claimant of—(1) the identity and
location of the artwork or other property; and (2) a possessory interest of the claimant in the artwork
or other property.”).
27 Id. at 981.
28 Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-308, § 2, 130 Stat.
1524-25.
29 Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-308, § 5, 130 Stat.
1524, 1526-27 (general intention of the law). See also Jennifer Anglim Kreder, Federal Holocaust-
Era Art Cases Filed by Survivors & Heirs Since Austria Returned Klimts to Ms. Altman in 2006,
SSRN, https://ssrn.com/abstract=1636295 (last updated Mar. 2018) (follow “Open PDF in
Browser”).
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Holocaust-era art restitution litigation since the end of WWII. Section III
discusses the Ninth Circuit’s application of HEAR and compares it to
subsequent interpretations of the Act. Lastly, section IV discusses
changes that Congress could make to HEAR that would help ensure that
the Act has the impact that the legislature intended.
I. CASSIRER V. THYSSEN-BORNEMISZA COLLECTION FOUNDATION:
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This section discusses the phases of litigation in Cassirer, starting
when Claude filed his complaint and ending with a discussion of the
most recent decision by the Ninth Circuit. Part A will cover Claude’s
discovery of the paintings in 2000; will look at Claude’s complaint,
which was filed in 2005; and lastly, will go over the procedural posture
of the case from 2005 to 2014. Part B examines the district court’s deci-
sion to award possession of the painting to Thyssen-Bornemisza Collec-
tion Foundation (“TBC”) in 2015. Lastly, part C describes the Ninth
Circuit’s decision to reverse the district court’s findings and remand the
case back to the lower court.
A. THE EARLY STAGES OF LITIGATION
It was not until 2000 that Claude became aware that the painting had
not been destroyed during the war but was in fact on display at the Thys-
sen-Bornemisza Museum in Madrid, Spain.30 Claude then petitioned the
Spanish “Minister of Education, Culture and Sports, Pilar del Castillo
Vera,”31 to return the painting, but Spain refused the request.32 Five U.S.
Congressmen also wrote to the Minister to request that Spain return the
painting, but the request was again denied.33
On May 10, 2005, Claude Cassirer filed a lawsuit against Spain and
TBC, in the Central District of California.34 Claude sought the return of a
painting that he alleged was unlawfully taken from his grandmother by
the Nazis.35 Claude’s complaint asserted “claims for declaratory relief,
30 Cassirer v. Thyssen-Bornemisza Collection Found., 153 F. Supp. 3d 1148, 1152 (C.D. Cal.
2015), rev’d and remanded, 862 F.3d 951 (9th Cir. 2017).
31 Cassirer v. Kingdom of Spain, 461 F. Supp. 2d 1157, 1161 (C.D. Cal. 2006), aff’d in part,
rev’d in part, 580 F.3d 1048 (9th Cir. 2009), rev’d en banc, 616 F.3d 1019 (9th Cir. 2010).
32 Cassirer, 153 F. Supp. 3d at 1152.
33 Cassirer, 461 F. Supp. 2d at 1161.
34 Cassirer v. Kingdom of Spain, No. CV 05-3459 GAF (CTX), 2006 WL 8423211, at *1
(C.D. Cal. Apr. 27, 2006).
35 Id.
5
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imposition of a constructive trust, possession of personal property, and
conversion.”36
The early stages of litigation focused on whether the Foreign Sover-
eign Immunities Act (“FSIA”) prevented the court from exercising juris-
diction over Spain and TBC.37 The plaintiff had the burden to show that
the painting, or any property that had been exchanged for the painting,
was in the U.S. due to the defendant’s commercial activity in the states.38
In August 2006, the district court held that TBC’s commercial activity39
in the U.S. was sufficient to trigger the expropriation exception to
FSIA,40 which allowed the court to exercise jurisdiction over the
defendants.41
Cassirer came before the Ninth Circuit for the first time in Septem-
ber 2009, after the defendants had filed a request for an interlocutory
appeal.42 The Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court’s findings and
held that the defendant had engaged in enough commercial activity in the
U.S. to trigger the expropriation exception to FSIA,43 and the case was
remanded back to the district court to determine whether the claimant
was subject to an exhaustion of remedies requirement.44 The Ninth Cir-
cuit then reheard the case en banc,45 and the three-judge panel upheld the
previous decision, finding again that the expropriation exception to FSIA
36 Cassirer v. Thyssen-Bornemisza Collection Found., No. CV 05-3459-GAF (CTX), 2012
WL 12875771, at *3 (C.D. Cal. May 24, 2012), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 737 F.3d 613 (9th Cir.
2013).
37 Cassirer v. Thyssen-Bornemisza Collection Found., 862 F.3d 951, 958 (9th Cir. 2017),
cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 1992 (2018).
38 Cassirer, No. CV 05-3459 GAF (CTX), 2006 WL 8423211, at *2 (quoting 28 U.S.C.
§ 1605(a)(3)).
39 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d) (“A ‘commercial activity’ means either a regular course of commer-
cial conduct or a particular commercial transaction or act. The commercial character of an activity
shall be determined by reference to the nature of the course of conduct or particular transaction or
act, rather than by reference to its purpose.”).
40 Cassirer v. Kingdom of Spain, 461 F. Supp. 2d 1157, 1175-76 (C.D. Cal. 2006), aff’d in
part, rev’d in part, 580 F.3d 1048 (9th Cir. 2009), rev’d en banc, 616 F.3d 1019 (9th Cir. 2010)
(“The Court concludes that Defendants have engaged such numerous commercial contacts with the
United States that the ‘commercial activity’ element of the expropriated property exception is easily
established . . . . [T]here are sales to United States residents of reproductions of the Painting, [ ] and
hundreds of other contacts involving the purchase and sale of merchandise . . . some of which are
directly related to Pissarro and even the Painting itself.”).
41 Id. at 1178.
42 See Cassirer v. Kingdom of Spain, 580 F.3d 1048 (9th Cir. 2009), rev’d en banc, 616 F.3d
1019 (9th Cir. 2010).
43 Id. at 1059.
44 Id. at 1051. See also id. at 1061 (The exhaustion of remedies requirement “generally pro-
vides that a state is not required to consider a claim, made by a person against a foreign state, and
alleging a violation of international law ‘until that person has exhausted domestic remedies, unless
such remedies are clearly sham or inadequate, or their application is unreasonably prolonged.’”).
45 Cassirer v. Kingdom of Spain, 590 F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 2009).
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had been triggered.46 After the en banc decision was issued, Claude
passed away;47 his children, David and Ava Cassirer, along with the
United Jewish Federation of San Diego County, substituted in as plain-
tiffs.48 The new plaintiffs dismissed Spain from the case and in ex-
change, TBC dropped its personal jurisdiction challenge.49
B. THE DISTRICT COURT AWARDS TBC POSSESSION OF THE PAINTING
Cassirer came back before the district court in June 2015, when
TBC filed a motion for summary judgment, and David and Ava Cassirer,
along with the United Jewish Federation of San Diego County, filed a
motion for summary adjudication.50 The plaintiffs’ motion argued that
California law must be used to decide the substantive issues in the case.51
Plaintiffs also argued that TBC’s adverse possession claim should be
barred because it was an accessory “to a crime against humanity or a
crime against property in the event of [an] armed conflict.”52 Lastly,
plaintiffs alleged that “Spain’s adverse possession laws violate[d] the Eu-
ropean Convention on Human Rights,” and should not be recognized.53
Defendant’s motion argued: that Spanish or Swiss law should be applied
to determine who is the owner of the painting, that under either Spanish
or Swiss law TBC was the rightful owner of the painting, and that the
plaintiffs’ claim was untimely under the applicable statute of
limitations.54
The district court conducted its choice-of-law analysis under both
federal common law55 and California law standards.56 The district court
46 Cassirer v. Kingdom of Spain, 616 F.3d 1019, 1027 (9th Cir. 2010) (In addition to the
commercial activity requirement, the FSIA expropriation exception requires that there be a taking in
violation of international law before a foreign government’s immunity can be overcome. The Ninth
Circuit determined that “a taking offends international law when: it does not serve a public purpose,
when it discriminates against those who are not nationals of the country, or when it is not accom-
plished with payment of just compensation.”).
47 Cassirer v. Thyssen-Bornemisza Collection Found., 737 F.3d 613, 616 (9th Cir. 2013).
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 Cassirer v. Thyssen-Bornemisza Collection Found., 153 F. Supp. 3d 1148, 1150 (C.D. Cal.
2015), rev’d and remanded, 862 F.3d 951 (9th Cir. 2017).
51 Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Adjudication at 1, Cassirer v. Thyssen-Bornemisza Collec-
tion Found., 153 F. Supp. 3d 1148 (C.D. Cal. 2015) (No. 2:05-cv-03459-JFW-E), 2015 WL
13648947, at *1.
52 Cassirer, 153 F. Supp. 3d at 1163.
53 Id.
54 Defendant’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment, Cassirer v. Thyssen-Bornemisza Collection Found., 153 F. Supp. 3d 1148 (C.D. Cal.
2015) (No. 2:05-cv-03459-JFW-E), 2015 WL 13648946.
55 Cassirer, 153 F. Supp. 3d at 1154 (“Federal common law follows the approach of the
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws . . . Restatement § 222 sets forth the general choice-of-
7
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applied both tests because of the uncertainty caused by a recent Ninth
Circuit decision,57 and a true conflict existed because “each jurisdiction
ha[d] an interest in having its own law applied.”58 The district court con-
cluded that Spanish law must be used to decide who is the owner of the
painting.59 The district court’s decision was critical because California
law does not recognize claims of adverse possession for personal
property.60
The district court also held that TBC had satisfied the requirements
for its adverse possession claim under Spanish law,61 and granted TBC’s
motion for summary judgment.62 Since the district court found that TBC
had satisfied all the requirements for an adverse possession claim under
Spanish law and was the rightful owner of the painting, it did not “ad-
dress whether the Baron acquired ownership of the [p]ainting by adverse
possession under Swiss law . . . or whether Plaintiff’s claims [were]
barred by laches.”63 Furthermore, the court found no merit in either of
the arguments that the plaintiff relied on to rebut TBC’s adverse posses-
law principle applicable to interests in both real and personal property: The interest of the parties in a
thing are determined depending upon the circumstances, either by the ‘law’ or by the ‘local law’ of
the state which, with respect to the particular issue, has the most significant relationship to the thing
and the parties . . . .”).
56 Id. at 1155–56 (“California applies the three-step ‘governmental interest’ test to resolve
choice-of-law issues: First, the court determines whether the relevant law of each of the potentially
affected jurisdictions with regard to the particular issue in question is the same or different. Second,
if there is a difference, the court examines each jurisdiction’s interest in the application of its own
law under the circumstances of the particular case to determine whether a true conflict exists. Third,
if the court finds that there is a true conflict, it carefully evaluates and compares the nature and
strength of the interest of each jurisdiction in the application of its own law to determine which
state’s interest would be more impaired if its policy were subordinated to the policy of the other
state, and then ultimately applies the law of the state whose interest would be more impaired if its
law were not applied.”).
57 Id. at 1154 (“Where, as here, federal court jurisdiction is premised on [FSIA] . . . the Ninth
Circuit has held that federal common law choice-of-law rules govern. However, the Ninth Circuit
recently called its holding into question in an en banc decision in Sachs v. Republic of Austria, 737
F.3d 584 (9th Cir.2013), stating that it may be permissible to apply the forum state’s choice-of-law
rules. Although the Ninth Circuit in Sachs did not overrule its prior case law, the Court, out of an
abundance of caution, will conduct a choice-of-law analysis under both federal common law and
California law.”).
58 Id. at 1156.
59 Id. at 1154-60.
60 Id. at 1156.
61 Id. at 1160.
62 Id. at 1168.
63 Id. at 1154.
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sion claim,64 but did state that if TBC had helped to cover up the paint-
ing’s theft then its adverse possession claim would have failed.65
The Cassirers’ claim was also found to be untimely pursuant to Cali-
fornia Code of Civil Procedure section 338.66 In 2010, the California
Legislature added section 338(c),67 which was designed to apply in cases
like Cassirer and provided a statute of limitations period that only began
to run after the claimant discovered the whereabouts of the artwork in
question.68 However, the district court ruled that a retroactive application
of section 338(c) would violate TBC’s due process rights because TBC
had satisfied the requirements for its adverse possession claim before
California’s Legislature passed section 338(c).69
Judge John F. Walter concluded his opinion with a plea aimed at
TBC and Spain, and recommended that the defendants take some time
before the next appeal to “pause, reflect, and consider whether it would
be appropriate to work towards a mutually agreeable resolution.”70 Espe-
cially considering Spain’s acceptance of the Washington Conference
Principles (“principles”),71 which indicated that Spain was “commit[ed]
to achiev[ing] ‘just and fair solutions’” for Holocaust-era art restitution
cases.72
C. THE NINTH CIRCUIT REVERSED THE DISTRICT COURT’S DECISION
TO AWARD TBC POSSESSION OF THE PAINTING
Cassirer came back before the Ninth Circuit for a third time in July
2017,73 after the plaintiffs filed for an appeal.74 After the Ninth Circuit
64 Id. at 1163 (Plaintiff argued that “(1) Spanish Civil Code Article 1956 bars the application
of adverse possession because the Foundation was an “accessory” to a crime against humanity or a
crime against property in the event of armed conflict; and (2) Spain’s adverse possession laws vio-
late the European Convention on Human Rights.”).
65 Id. at 1163-64.
66 See id. at 1168.
67 Id.
68 Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 338(c)(3).
69 Cassirer, 153 F. Supp. 3d at 1168.
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 See Cassirer v. Thyssen-Bornemisza Collection Found., 862 F.3d 951, 954 (9th Cir. 2017),
cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 1992 (2018).
74 Appellants’ Brief, Cassirer v. Thyssen-Bornemisza Collection Found., 862 F.3d 951 (9th
Cir. 2017) (No. 15-55550), 2016 WL 281340 (The appellants’ brief raised four questions for the
Ninth Circuit to consider: “1. Did the District Court err in holding TBC owned the Painting via
acquisitive prescription when the Court incorrectly defined encubridor under Spanish Civil Code
Article 1956; and/or TBC is a perpetrator under Spanish law when all facts are viewed in the light
most favorable to Plaintiffs? 2. Does Spain’s Historical Heritage law prohibit TBC from acquiring
the Painting through acquisitive prescription? 3. Did the District Court err in applying Spanish law in
9
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consolidated the parties’ arguments, there were several issues left for the
court to decide.75 These issues can be summarized into two points: first,
whether the district court erred in finding that TBC had satisfied all the
requirements necessary to succeed on their adverse possession claim
under Spanish law; and second, whether the Cassirer’s claim was
timely.76 The Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiff’s claim was timely
under the newly enacted HEAR77 and reversed the district court’s deci-
sion to award TBC possession of the painting.78 The Ninth Circuit re-
manded the case back to the district court to determine whether TBC had
known that the painting was stolen and helped cover up the theft for its
own benefit. If so, the defendant would be labeled as an encubridor
under Spanish law—essentially an accessory after the fact—and its ad-
verse possession claim would fail.79 This section will look at the Ninth
Circuit’s application of HEAR in Cassirer and will discuss the issues
that remain unresolved after the appeal.
1. The Cassirer’s Claim Was Found to be Timely Under HEAR
Congress passed HEAR in December 2016,80 and Cassirer was the
first time that the Act was before a U.S. Circuit Court for review.81
HEAR created “a six-year statute of limitations period that commences
on the date of actual discovery of the artwork’s location by the claim-
ant.”82 HEAR controlled what the applicable statute of limitations was in
Cassirer for two reasons: one, Lilly was forced to turn over the painting
to the Nazis in 1939, so the taking fell within the Act’s “covered pe-
riod;”83 and two, HEAR can be applied retroactively “to any claims that
[were] pending on the date of HEAR’s enactment” even if the claim was
on appeal.84 The Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiffs’ claim was timely
under HEAR because Claude discovered the location of the painting by
a manner that violates The European Convention on Human Rights? 4. Did the District Court err in
failing to apply California law?”).
75 Cassirer, 862 F.3d at 981.
76 Id. at 959.
77 Id. at 959-60.
78 Id. at 981.
79 Id.
80 Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-308, 130 Stat. 1524.
81 David W. Bowker et al., Ninth Circuit Applies the Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery
Act of 2016 to Revive Previously Dismissed Nazi-Era Art Appropriation Case, LEXOLOGY (Aug. 2,
2017), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=10498290-74c4-4522-b9fe-a620813155a7.
82 § 5, 130 Stat. at 1526.
83 Cassirer, 862 F.3d at 960 (quoting Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act of 2016, Pub.
L. No. 114-308, § 4, 130 Stat. 1524, 1526) (“The term ‘covered period’ means the period beginning
on January 1, 1933, and ending on December 31, 1945.”).
84 Id. (quoting § 5, 130 Stat. at 1527).
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2000, and subsequently filed his complaint on May 10, 2005; therefore,
the lawsuit had been filed “within six-years of actual discovery.”85
Since Cassirer marked the first time that HEAR was raised before a
U.S. Circuit Court,86 the court allocated a portion of its opinion to dis-
cuss HEAR’s provisions.87 This allowed the court to clarify some mis-
conceptions that the parties had about the newly passed Act.88 The
Cassirers argued that Spanish law should not be used to decide the sub-
stantive issues in the case because its application would lead to an unjust
and unfair outcome, which would contradict HEAR’s intended pur-
pose.89 The court determined that regardless of any policy objectives that
Congress referenced, HEAR’s operative provisions only provided an in-
creased statute-of-limitations period, and therefore the Act could “not
alter the [court’s] choice of law analysis.”90 The court also informed the
parties that HEAR did not affect TBC’s ability to assert a claim for ad-
verse possession because the Act does not “bar claims based on the sub-
stantive law that vests title in a possessor.”91
HEAR allowed the Ninth Circuit to overturn the district court’s rul-
ing and hold that the Cassirers’ claim was timely,92 but there are issues
unaddressed by the Act that can impact whether Cassirer can be resolved
justly and fairly.93
2. Several Issues Remained Unresolved After the Ninth Circuit’s
Decision
In addition to the timeliness of the Cassirers’ claim, the Ninth Cir-
cuit had to rule on several other issues, including whether the district
court was correct to rule that Spanish law must be used to decide who is
the owner of the painting; whether the Baron had vested title in the paint-
ing before he donated his art collection to TBC; whether the Cassirer’s
restitution claim was barred by laches or by Lilly’s acceptance of a set-
tlement with Germany; and whether Spain’s Historical Heritage Law or
85 Id.
86 Bowker et al., supra note 81.
87 Cassirer, 862 F.3d at 959-60.
88 Id. at 964.
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 Id. at 965 (“Read in context, HEAR’s § 5(a) language that the six-year statute of limita-
tions applies “notwithstanding any defense at law relating to the passage of time” is meant to prevent
courts from applying defenses that would have the effect of shortening the six-year period in which a
suit may be commenced.”).
92 Id. at 960.
93 See id. at 981.
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the European Convention on Human Rights prevented TBC from ob-
taining title.94
Whether the Baron had acquired vested title in the painting before he
transferred it to TBC was found to be an issue not fit for summary judg-
ment because the “evidence indicates there is a triable issue of fact” as to
whether the “Baron was a good faith possessor under Swiss Law.”95 The
court also ruled that the 1958 settlement agreement between Lilly and the
German government did not prevent the Cassirers from bringing future
claims because the agreement only settled mutual claims between the
parties and Lilly never waived her right to pursue restitution if the paint-
ing was ever found.96 Next, the court prohibited the plaintiff from assert-
ing that Spain’s Historical Heritage Law prevented TBC from arguing
that it had “acquired title to the [p]ainting through” adverse possession
because the issue was not raised at the district court.97
Lastly, the Ninth Circuit found no error in the district court’s deci-
sion to apply Spanish law but did find an error in the lower court’s inter-
pretation of the Spanish Civil Code.98 The district court determined that
TBC’s adverse possession claim was not affected by Article 1956 of the
Spanish Civil Code because they were “not an accessory to the crimes
committed by Scheidwimmer and the Nazis.”99 However, the Ninth Cir-
cuit conducted a further review of Article 1956 and of the term en-
cubridor, and determined that “someone who knowingly receives and
benefits from stolen property can qualify as an” encubridor under Article
1956 of the Spanish Civil Code.100 The Ninth Circuit remanded the case
back to the district court because a further factual examination was nec-
essary to establish whether TBC was aware that the painting had been
stolen and if it helped to cover up the theft;101 either of which would
impact TBC’s ability to succeed on its adverse possession claim.102
94 Id. at 955-56.
95 Id. at 976.
96 Id. at 977.
97 Id. at 979.
98 Id. at 976.
99 Cassirer v. Thyssen-Bornemisza Collection Found., 153 F. Supp. 3d 1148, 1165 (C.D. Cal.
2015), rev’d and remanded, 862 F.3d 951 (9th Cir. 2017).
100 Cassirer, 862 F.3d at 970.
101 Id. at 981.
102 Id. at 965 (“When the court looked at the surrounding statutes in the Spanish Civil Code,
it found that Spain cannot have obtained possession of the painting if they were an ‘encubridor’ or
had acted in bad faith. Thus, TBC did not meet its burden under a summary judgment motion
because a ‘triable issue of fact’ remained as to whether TBC knew the painting had been stolen from
its original owners.”).
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II. FACTUAL AND LEGISLATIVE BACKGROUND
Part A provides an account of the Cassirer family story and dis-
cusses events that occurred before, during, and after WWII. Part B exam-
ines America’s legislative efforts after the war, many of which were
influential in the development of HEAR, including the Nuremberg Tri-
als, The Washington Conference on Holocaust-era Assets, and The Holo-
caust Victims Redress Act. Lastly, part C looks at the legislative intent
behind HEAR and discusses why the Act was enacted.
A. THE CASSIRER FAMILY STORY
The Cassirers were a well-respected, affluent Jewish family who
lived in Germany at the start of WWII.103 Julius Cassirer had several
successful businesses, and the family’s great wealth provided them with
the means to accumulate a large art collection.104 One of the Cassirer
family’s prized paintings, Rue St. Honore´, apre`s midi, effet de pluie,105
was painted by Camille Pissarro, the “Father of Impressionism,” in
1897.106 Julius bought the painting in 1898 from Durand-Ruel, a re-
nowned art dealer and friend of Pissarro.107 Julius passed away in 1924
and bequeathed the painting to his son, Fritz Cassirer.108 Fritz passed
away two years later and his wife Lilly became the sole owner of the
painting.109
Lilly was forced to leave Germany in 1939 because the country had
become increasingly hostile towards its Jewish citizens.110 In order to
obtain an exit visa and safe passage out of Germany, Lilly was forced to
sell the painting to Jakob Scheidwimmer—an art appraiser that worked
for the Nazis—for approximately $360.111 Scheidwimmer then traded
the painting to an anonymous art dealer, who snuck the painting out of
Germany and into the Netherlands.112 The Gestapo eventually found the
103 Cassirer v. Kingdom of Spain, 580 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2009), rev’d en banc, 616
F.3d 1019 (9th Cir. 2010).
104 Complaint, Cassirer v. Kingdom of Spain, (C.D. Cal. 2005) (No. CV 05-3459 GAF), 2005
WL 3986996.
105 Cassirer v. Thyssen-Bornemisza Collection Found., 153 F. Supp. 3d 1148, 1151 (C.D.
Cal. 2015), rev’d and remanded, 862 F.3d 951 (9th Cir. 2017).
106 Biography of Camille Pissarro, CAMILLE-PISSARRO.ORG, https://www.camille-pissarro
.org/biography.html (last visited Aug. 27, 2018).
107 Complaint, Cassirer v. Kingdom of Spain, (C.D. Cal. 2005) (No. CV 05-3459 GAF), 2005
WL 3986996; see also Cassirer v. Kingdom of Spain, 580 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2009).
108 Id.
109 Id.; see also Cassirer, 580 F.3d at 1052.
110 Id.
111 Cassirer v. Kingdom of Spain, 616 F.3d 1019, 1023 (9th Cir. 2010).
112 Cassirer, 580 F.3d at 1052-53.
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painting and brought it back to Germany.113 By the end of WWII, the
painting had been auctioned off several times and ended up in a private
gallery in the United States (“U.S.”).114
When Lilly returned to Germany after WWII, she filed a claim for
restitution against the German government.115 The German government
had incorrectly determined that the painting was destroyed, and this mis-
information led Lilly to agree to a settlement.116 As part of the settle-
ment, Lilly received 120 thousand Deutsche Marks117 but reserved her
right to take further legal action if the painting was ever discovered.118
Lilly passed away in 1962 and bequeathed all of her possessions to her
grandson,119 Claude Cassirer.120
In 1976, Baron Hans Heinrich Thyssen-Bornemisza (“Baron”) pur-
chased the painting “at a price far below market value” even though there
was “virtually no provenance research and no documentation accounting
for the [p]ainting’s whereabouts” for the previous 40 years.121 The
Baron, who was one of the world’s preeminent art collectors at the time,
seemingly ignored the torn-gallery label on the back of the painting; the
label “was unique to the Cassirers[’] [gallery] in Germany” and partially
listed the gallery’s address.122 The painting remained in the Baron’s pri-
vate gallery until 1988 when the Baron leased his art collection to
Spain.123 Spain later agreed to buy the Baron’s art collection for approxi-
mately $327 million.124 As part of the agreement, Spain converted the
113 Id.
114 Id. at 1053,
115 Cassirer v. Thyssen-Bornemisza Collection Found., 153 F. Supp. 3d 1148, 1151 (C.D.
Cal. 2015), rev’d and remanded, 862 F.3d 951 (9th Cir. 2017).
116 Id.
117 Cassirer v. Thyssen-Bornemisza Collection Found., No. CV 05-3459-JFW (EX), 2015
WL 12672087, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 2015).
118 Cassirer,153 F. Supp. 3d at 1151; see also Cassirer, No. CV 05-3459-JFW (EX), 2015
WL 12672087, at *2 (“The 1958 Settlement Agreement did not include a comparable waiver, or any
waiver, of Lilly’s right to restitution of the Pissarro Painting [. . .] the 1958 Settlement Agreement
merely provides: ‘This Settlement settles all mutual claims among the parties, including any claims
which might exist in accordance with Art. 47 REG.’”).
119 Complaint at 7, 10, Cassirer v. Kingdom of Spain, 461 F. Supp. 2d 1157 (C.D. Cal. 2006)
(No. CV05-3459 GAF (CTX)), 2005 WL 3986996 (explaining that Claude’s mother, Eva Cassirer,
died from influenza in 1921, Claude was only four-months old at the time and was predominantly
raised by his grandmother, Lilly).
120 Cassirer v. Thyssen-Bornemisza Collection Found., 737 F.3d 613, 616 (9th Cir. 2013).
121 Brief for Appellant at 7, Cassirer v. Thyssen-Bornemisza Collection Found., 862 F.3d 951
(9th Cir. 2017) (No. 15-55550) 2016 WL 281340, at *7.
122 Brief for Respondent in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 8, Cassirer v.
Thyssen-Bornemisza Collection Found., 862 F.3d 951 (9th Cir. 2017) (No. 15-55550), 2018 WL
1729149, at *8.
123 Cassirer v. Kingdom of Spain, 580 F.3d 1048, 1053 (9th Cir. 2009), rev’d en banc, 616
F.3d 1019 (9th Cir. 2010).
124 Id.
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Villahermosa Palace in Madrid into a museum to house the Baron’s art
collection.125 The painting remains on display at the Thyssen-
Bornemisza Museum.126
B. SINCE WWII, AMERICA’S LEGISLATIVE EFFORTS TO RIGHT THE
WRONGS OF THE HOLOCAUST HAVE BEEN LIMITED
When WWII ended it was no secret that much of the world had
sustained massive damage and unprecedented casualties. However, many
people remained unaware of the full extent of the horrendous crimes the
Nazis had carried out during the Holocaust.127 Rebuilding efforts began
shortly after the war ended when a group of world powers—including
the U.S., United Kingdom (“U.K.”), France, and the Soviet Union—de-
veloped a plan to ensure that those responsible for the Holocaust would
be made to answer for their crimes.128 Six months after the Nazis surren-
dered, the Nuremberg Trials (“Trials”) began.129 The aim of the Trials
was to ensure “the just and prompt trial and punishment of the major war
criminals of the European Axis.”130 The Trials marked America’s first
attempt to bring justice to Holocaust victims, survivors, and their
families.
America revitalized its efforts to bring justice to Holocaust survivors
at the tail end of the 20th century. Beginning with the Clinton adminis-
tration, the restitution of Holocaust-era artwork became a political focus
in the U.S.131 By the end of the 20th century, the U.S. had become instru-
mental in the resurgence of global restitution efforts.132 In December
1998, the U.S. organized the Washington Conference on Holocaust-era
Assets (“Conference”), which was attended by 44 countries and 13 non-
governmental organizations.133
125 Cassirer v. Thyssen-Bornemisza Collection Found., 153 F. Supp. 3d 1148, 1151 (C.D.
Cal. 2015), rev’d and remanded, 862 F.3d 951 (9th Cir. 2017).
126 Rue Saint-Honore´ in the Afternoon. Effect of Rain, MUSEO NACIONAL THYSSEN-
BORNEMISZA, https://www.museothyssen.org/en/collection/artists/pissarro-camille/rue-saint-honore-
afternoon-effect-rain (last visited Aug. 8, 2018).
127 Iris Kesternich et al., The Effects of World War II on Economic and Health Outcomes
Across Europe, 96 REV. ECON. & STAT. 103 (2014).
128 David Scheffer, Nuremberg Trials, 39 STUD. TRANSNAT’L LEGAL POL’Y 155 (2008).
129 Id.
130 Id. at 156.
131 Jessica Mullery, Fulfilling the Washington Principles: A Proposal for Arbitration Panels
to Resolve Holocaust-Era Art Claims, 11 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 643, 649-51 (2010).
132 Id. at 449.
133 Holocaust Restitution: Summary of the Washington Conference on Holocaust-Era Assets,
JEWISH VIRTUAL LIBR. (Nov. 24, 1999), http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/summary-of-the-wash-
ington-conference.
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The goal of the Conference was to develop a set of principles that
would help guide the legislative efforts of the countries in attendance,
with the hope that each of the attendees could establish a system in their
country of origin that would help to ensure Holocaust-era art restitution
claims were handled justly and fairly.134 The principles called for at-
tendees to increase their country’s efforts to identify art that was stolen
by the Nazis.135 Attendees were also asked to be mindful of the fact that
the historical record in these disputes is not always clear before making
decisions on ownership.136 Countries were encouraged to implement
these principles, “especially as they relate to alternative dispute resolu-
tion,” but since the principles were only suggestions and non-binding,
attendees were not required to take any further action.137
The Conference helped kick-start the resurgence of global efforts to
return art looted by Nazis to its rightful owners,138 but in the 20 years
since, Congress has only passed one piece of legislation that attempted to
implement the recommendations laid out in the principles: The Holo-
caust Victims Redress Act.139 The Act encouraged states “to make good
faith efforts to return art looted by the Nazis” and gave the President the
authority to allocate finances towards the development of a strategy that
would help move restitution efforts forward.140 The Act led to the forma-
tion of the Presidential Advisory Commission on Holocaust Assets in the
United States (“Commission”).141 The Commission reviewed what had
“happened to the assets of victims of the Holocaust that ended up in the
possession of the United States Federal government.”142 The Commis-
134 WASHINGTON CONFERENCE ON HOLOCAUST-ERA ASSETS, NOVEMBER 30-DECEMBER 3,
1998, PROCEEDINGS (Message from the Editor) (J.D. Bindenagel, ed. 1999) (presenting a record of
all statements and information provided during the Washington Conference), available at https://
1997-2001.state.gov/regions/eur/holocaust/heaca.pdf.
135 WASHINGTON CONFERENCE ON HOLOCAUST-ERA ASSETS, NOVEMBER 30-DECEMBER 3,
1998, PROCEEDINGS 912 (J.D. Bindenagel, ed. 1999) (listing the eleven Washington Principles on
Nazi-Confiscated Art), available at https://1997-2001.state.gov/regions/eur/holocaust/heacappen
.pdf.
136 Id.
137 Id.
138 Mullery, supra note 131, at 649.
139 Holocaust Victims Redress Act, Pub. L. No. 105-158, § 202, 112 Stat. 15, 17 (1998) (“It
is the sense of the Congress that consistent with the 1907 Hague Convention, all governments should
undertake good faith efforts to facilitate the return of private and public property, such as works of
art, to the rightful owners in cases where assets were confiscated from the claimant during the period
of Nazi rule and there is reasonable proof that the claimant is the rightful owner.”).
140 Lauren F. Redman, A Wakeup Call for a Uniform Statute of Limitations in Art Restitution
Cases, 15 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 203, 222-23 (2008).
141 Id. at 223.
142 Presidential Advisory Commission on Holocaust Assets, CLINTON DIGITAL LIBR., https://
clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/collections/show/20 (last visited Nov. 7, 2018).
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sion’s final report made a number of recommendations but none of them
were ever implemented into legislation.143
C. THE DEVELOPMENT AND PURPOSE OF HEAR
When HEAR was enacted it attracted wide support from Democrats
and Republicans alike,144 and was generally heralded as a huge step for-
ward.145 The president of the World Jewish Congress at the time said that
HEAR would “have a major effect on the future” of Holocaust-era art
restitution litigation.146 Congress had intended for HEAR “[t]o provide
the victims of the Holocaust-era persecution and their heirs a fair oppor-
tunity to recover works of art confiscated or misappropriated by the Na-
zis.”147 Congress’s findings highlighted the importance of HEAR and
discussed the extent of Nazi looting during WWII, America’s previous
efforts aimed at impacting Holocaust-era art restitution cases, and the
low rate of success that claimants seeking restitution had experienced in
U.S. courts.148
Congress passed HEAR in response to the Von Saher v. Norton Si-
mon Museum of Art at Pasadena decision.149 In Von Saher, the plaintiff,
Marei Von Saher, sought the return of several paintings that the Nazis
had stolen from her family.150 When Ms. Saher discovered that her fam-
ily’s paintings were on display at the Norton Simon Museum of Art in
Pasadena, she requested that the museum return the paintings.151 The
museum refused to comply with the request and Ms. Saher filed a law-
suit.152 Ms. Saher’s claim was eventually dismissed before the court had
an opportunity to rule on who the rightful owner was because the statute
of limitations had run before she filed her claim.153
Statutes of limitations are supposed to ensure that claims are filed
promptly, that the art’s current possessor is protected from having his or
her title challenged by “bad evidence,” and that commerce is not hin-
143 Redman, supra note 140, at 223.
144 Emmarie Huetteman, Senate Bill Would Help Recover Art Stolen by Nazis, N.Y. TIMES
(June 7, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/08/arts/design/senate-bill-would-help-recover-art-
stolen-by-nazis.html.
145 Id.
146 Id.
147 Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-308, 130 Stat. 1524,
1524.
148 § 2, 130 Stat. at 1524-25.
149 Id.
150 Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art, 592 F.3d 954, 957 (9th Cir. 2010).
151 Brief for Appellant at 7, Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art, 578 F.3d 1016 (9th
Cir. 2009) (No. 07-56691), 2009 WL 644327.
152 See id.
153 Von Saher, 592 F.3d at 968-69.
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dered by a fear of inadequate legal protection.154 Yet, when HEAR was
enacted in 2016, statute-of-limitations defenses had become one of the
biggest hurdles for claimants seeking restitution of art looted by the Na-
zis, and it often resulted in the case’s dismissal.155
Congress saw HEAR as a means of ensuring that art restitution cases
were resolved on the merits of each party’s claim and not because of an
insurmountable procedural hurdle.156 To help claimants overcome this
hurdle, HEAR created a six-year statute of limitations for Holocaust-era
art restitution claims that began to run after the claimant discovered the
location of the art in question.157 However, HEAR failed to address other
hurdles that commonly arise in Holocaust-era art restitution cases that
impact a claimant’s chances at obtaining a just and fair resolution of his
or her claim. The legislative intent and purpose discussed in HEAR will
not be fully achievable unless Congress addresses these other hurdles.
III. THE NINTH CIRCUIT CORRECTLY INTERPRETED HEAR’S
SUBSTANTIVE PROVISIONS BUT MISSED AN OPPORTUNITY TO
HIGHLIGHT THE ACT’S SHORTCOMINGS
This Note takes the position that the Ninth Circuit correctly inter-
preted and applied HEAR’s substantive provisions in Cassirer. The
Act’s operative provisions are stated clearly and are rather limited, which
left little room for alternate interpretation.158 However, HEAR’s stated
purpose is not readily attainable based on the Act’s substantive provi-
sions alone. The discrepancies between HEAR’s intended purpose and
the Act’s operative provisions creates an ambiguity, and the Ninth Cir-
cuit missed an opportunity to alert Congress to the fact that the Act’s
provisions are insufficient to satisfy its stated purpose.
Since the Ninth Circuit reviewed HEAR in 2017, other courts have
had an opportunity to interpret the Act. The New York Supreme Court
case, Reif v. Naggy, provides an example of a court taking an alternate
approach to interpreting HEAR.159 Similar to Cassirer, Reif is a case in
which a plaintiff sought the restitution of artwork that the Nazis stole
from his family in WWII.160 Justice Ramos, who decided the case, ruled
154 Redman, supra note 140, at 211.
155 Id. at 210.
156 Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-308, § 3, 130 Stat.
1524, 1526.
157 § 5, 130 Stat. 1524, 1526 (“The term ‘actual discovery’ means knowledge,” and “[t]he
term ‘knowledge’ means having actual knowledge of a fact or circumstance or sufficient information
with regard to a relevant fact or circumstance to amount to actual knowledge thereof.”).
158 Id. at 1526-28.
159 Reif v. Nagy, 80 N.Y.S.3d 629, 633 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2018).
160 Id. at 629.
18
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 49, Iss. 1 [2019], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol49/iss1/4
2019] Cassirer v. Thyssen-Bornemisza Collection Foundation 21
that HEAR could be used by the plaintiff to defeat the defendant’s laches
defense.161 This decision was rather alarming because laches is an equi-
table defense and the terms of HEAR state that it only acts as a shield
from “defense[s] at law relating to the passage of time.”162 Judge Ramos
seemingly ignored HEAR’s substantive provisions and interpreted the
Act in a manner that took account of what Congress’s intended purpose
was when it passed the Act.163
While the Ninth Circuit did not err in its interpretation and applica-
tion of HEAR’s substantive provisions, the court did waste an opportu-
nity to alert Congress to HEAR’s shortcomings. The two varying
methods of interpreting HEAR highlight the ambiguity that is created by
the wide discrepancy between the Act’s intended purpose and actual im-
pact. Hopefully, Congress will be made aware of HEAR’s shortcomings
and will add provisions to the Act that allow U.S. courts to resolve Holo-
caust-era art restitution cases justly and fairly.
IV. SOLUTIONS
This Note argues that Congress must amend HEAR to make it better
suited to deal with the hurdles that claimants, like the Cassirer family,
commonly face when they seek restitution. In Cassirer, many of the pro-
cedural and legal issues that came before the court appear frequently in
Holocaust-era art restitution cases.164 If Congress wants HEAR to
achieve its stated objective—to ensure the fair and just resolution of Hol-
ocaust-era art restitution claims based on the merits of each side’s
claim—then it should look to the trial record in Cassirer to better under-
stand the hurdles that a claimant may face that could prevent such a
resolution.
The necessity of this expansion is shown in the trial record of Holo-
caust-era art restitution cases in the U.S., where there have been very few
favorable verdicts issued for a claimant over the last decade.165 If Con-
gress does not broaden the scope of HEAR, then the Cassirer family
could face the same outcome that the majority of claimants have faced: a
slim chance at settlement or a dismissal of their claim.166 Alternatively, if
161 Id. at 635.
162 Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-308, § 5, 130 Stat.
1524, 1526.
163 Reif, 80 N.Y.S.3d at 633.
164 See generally Kreder, Federal Holocaust-Era Art Cases Filed by Survivors & Heirs Since
Austria Returned Klimts to Ms. Altman in 2006, SSRN, https://ssrn.com/abstract=1636295 (last up-
dated Mar. 2018) (follow “Open PDF in Browser”).
165 Id.
166 See generally id.
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Congress does not expand the scope of HEAR, then Cassirer and other
Holocaust-era art restitution cases should be resolved through alternate
means of dispute resolution, as addressed by the Act.167 Part A of this
section will discuss ways that Congress can remedy HEAR’s shortcom-
ings. Part B will discuss a model for alternative dispute resolution that
Congress should implement if HEAR is not amended.
A. AMENDMENTS CONGRESS SHOULD MAKE TO HEAR THAT WOULD
ALLOW THE ACT TO FULFILL ITS STATED PURPOSE
Congress’s aim in passing HEAR was to tackle a key issue—statute-
of-limitations defenses—that had greatly limited a plaintiff’s ability to
have his or her restitution claim decided justly and fairly.168 Yet, HEAR
fails to address several issues and hurdles that arose in Cassirer, all of
which can impact the ability of the case to be resolved justly and fairly.
HEAR should be expanded to include provisions that address whether
claims for adverse possession of personal property will be recognized
and that establish a uniform method for how choice-of-law analysis will
be conducted in these cases.
One of the key issues left to be decided in Cassirer is whether
TBC’s claim for adverse possession will be successful.169 If Congress
wants to ensure that Cassirer and other Holocaust-era art restitution
cases are resolved fairly and justly, then claims of adverse possession for
personal property should be prohibited. Adverse possession seeks to pun-
ish an owner who “slept upon their rights,”170 but if TBC’s adverse pos-
session claim is successful, then the Cassirers, who have pursued
restitution for three generations, would be treated the same as a negligent
owner. Congress should expand HEAR’s provisions with the goal of es-
tablishing procedures that ensure that the Cassirers and other similar
claimants are not treated like negligent owners, and have their claims
resolved in a manner that considers the complex historical context from
which these claims stem.171 Prohibiting adverse possession claims for
personal property in Holocaust-era art restitution cases could anger de-
fendants, but without this provision the Cassirer family would face an
167 Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-308, § 2, 130 Stat.
1524, 1525.
168 § 2, 130 Stat. at 1524-25.
169 Cassirer v. Thyssen-Bornemisza Collection Found., 862 F.3d 951, 981 (9th Cir. 2017).
170 Bowman v. Wathen, 42 U.S. 189, 189 (1843).
171 § 2, 130 Stat. at 1524-25.
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insurmountable task in having to locate the painting before TBC satisfied
the statutory time requirement for its adverse possession claim.172
Another issue previously addressed in Cassirer, which HEAR does
not address, was the court’s choice-of-law analysis and subsequent deci-
sion that Spanish law must be used to decide the substantive issues in the
case. This decision could be very influential in Cassirer, especially if
TBC’s adverse possession claim is found to be successful when the case
comes back before the district court.173 Since HEAR did not establish a
process for choice-of-law analysis in Holocaust-era art restitution cases,
the court reverted to its default choice-of-law analysis.174 The Ninth Cir-
cuit’s ultimate decision to apply Spanish law to the substantive issues in
the case could have reached a different outcome if the case was brought
in a different circuit.175 Yet, close call or not, the court’s decision to
apply Spanish law allowed TBC to bring an adverse possession claim for
personal property that otherwise would have been prohibited. The deci-
sion also put the court in a situation where it had to interpret Spanish
law, and international law is “more difficult for a federal court to discern,
determine, and apply.”176
By adding a provision to HEAR, which establishes that all substan-
tive issues in a Holocaust-era art restitution case must be resolved under
the forum’s laws, judicial proceedings could be expedited; the difficult
task of interpreting foreign laws could be avoided; and in Cassirer, the
court could have circumvented having to decide adverse possession
claims for personal property.177 Furthermore, defendants as well as plain-
tiffs would benefit from the increased uniformity that this change would
provide because there would no longer be questions over how the court
will conduct its choice-of-law analysis.178
B. IF CONGRESS DOES NOT AMEND HEAR’S PROVISIONS THEN IT
MUST ESTABLISH A METHOD FOR ADR
The ideal resolution to HEAR’s shortcomings would be for Con-
gress to amend the Act, but if Congress fails to broaden HEAR’s scope
then procedures for ADR should be established because America’s
172 Cassirer v. Thyssen-Bornemisza Collection Found., 153 F. Supp. 3d 1148, 1152 (C.D.
Cal. 2015).
173 Cassirer, 862 F.3d at 963.
174 Id. at 960-61.
175 Id. at 962-63.
176 Id. at 963.
177 See generally Hannelore Sklar, Note, Choice of Law Under the Foreign Sovereign Immu-
nities Act: Cassirer v. Thyssen-Bornemisza Collection Foundation and the Unresolved Disagree-
ment Among the Circuits, 47 GEO. J. INT’L L. 1197 (2016).
178 Id.
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courts have been an unfavorable venue for claimants seeking restitution
for art taken during the Holocaust.179 The idea of establishing ADR for
Holocaust-era art restitution cases is discussed in the Washington Con-
ference Principles, which called for Conference attendees to implement
procedures for ADR.180 While there are advantages and disadvantages to
both traditional litigation and ADR, ideally, both could coexist. This
would allow a claimant to have options as to where they will pursue their
claim.181
One model for ADR that Congress could look to for inspiration is
the U.K.’s Spoilation Advisory Panel approach. The U.K. has a history
of success in resolving restitution disputes through ADR,182 and adopted
a Spoliation Advisory Panel (“Panel”) approach to ADR in 2000.183
Under the Panel approach, the Secretary of State acts as a chairman and
is tasked with appointing the other members of the Panel.184 Parties have
the option to pursue ADR before the Panel instead of traditional litiga-
tion.185 Yet, the Panel’s recommendations are not legally binding unless
the claimant accepts the Panel’s recommendation.186 If the claimant ac-
cepts the recommendation, then it is treated as a “full and final settlement
of the claim.”187
The process for ADR usually begins when the parties meet with an
independent mediator, who “sets the ground rules” and identifies the is-
sues that are in dispute.188 Ideally, both sides can reach an agreement and
settle the dispute without having to go to court.189 Even if the parties fail
to reach an agreement, the process can still be beneficial because it
forces the parties to have a preliminary discussion regarding their
dispute.
ADR could have been very beneficial in the early stages of Cassirer.
The parties’ motion practice went back and forth for almost a decade and
having a controlled setting for preliminary discussions could have al-
lowed both sides to reach an agreement and avoid lengthy and costly
179 See generally Kreder, supra note 164.
180 Alternative Dispute Resolution is defined as “any procedure for settling a dispute by
means other than litigation.” Alternative Dispute Resolution, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed.
2014).
181 See generally Mullery, supra note 131, at 649-51.
182 Government Bodies: Spoliation Advisory Panel, LOOTED ART, http://www.lootedart.com/
MFEU4P88744 (last visited Mar. 19, 2018).
183 Id.
184 Id.
185 Id.
186 Id.
187 Id.
188 Smith, supra note 5, at 273.
189 Id.
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litigation. If a dual system with both traditional litigation and ADR had
been available, then the Cassirer family would have had the opportunity
to test the waters in mediation or arbitration before pursuing traditional
litigation, which is far more expensive and takes considerably more time.
V. CONCLUSION
In an interview, David Cassirer discussed the toll that the drawn-out
litigation had taken on him and his family: “the battle is very long al-
ready, with the result that my father died on the way, now my sister Ava
has just died, both died without seeing the recovery of the painting.”190
HEAR brought fresh life to the Cassirers’ chances but another trial
now stands between them and the painting they wish to recover.191 While
the Ninth Circuit may have missed an opportunity to highlight HEAR’s
shortcomings, the issue is one that can only be resolved by the legisla-
ture. Congress must act now to ensure that Cassirer and similar cases are
resolved based on the merits of the parties’ claims and in a manner that is
just and fair. This Note has stated two solutions that could bring HEAR’s
substantive provisions in line with its stated purpose. First, Congress
should add provisions to HEAR that address the common hurdles claim-
ants face when they seek restitution. In the alternative, Congress should
implement a process for ADR in order to establish an alternative venue
for these claims to be resolved.
When Congress enacted HEAR, it was widely celebrated as a great
step towards achieving justice.192 Congress must take a thorough look at
the full scope of issues a claimant, like the Cassirers, can face and
change HEAR’s provision so that the Act’s goal of achieving a just and
fair resolution of these restitution claims can be achievable.193
190 Aldo Mas, El Heredero Judı´o Que Lucha Contra Espan˜a y el Thyssen Por Recuperar un
Cuadro Familiar Robado por los Nazis [The Jewish Heir Who Fights Against Spain and the Thyssen
for Recovering a Family Picture Stolen by the Nazis], EL DIARIO (May 2, 2018, 8:32 PM), https://
www.eldiario.es/cultura/arte/heredero-Espana-Thyssen-recuperar-familiar_0_767123355.html.
191 Cassirer v. Thyssen-Bornemisza Collection Found., 862 F.3d 951, 981 (9th Cir. 2017).
192 Huetteman, supra note 144.
193 Cassirer v. Thyssen-Bornemisza Collection Found., 153 F. Supp. 3d 1148, 1155 (C.D.
Cal. 2015), rev’d and remanded, 862 F.3d 951 (9th Cir. 2017).
23
Joy: Cassirer v. Thyssen-Bornemisza Collection Foundation, Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act, Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2019
26 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49
24
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 49, Iss. 1 [2019], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol49/iss1/4
